This paper investigates the impact of pre-existing offline data on online learning, in the context of dynamic pricing. We study a single-product dynamic pricing problem over a selling horizon of T periods. The demand in each period is determined by the price of the product according to a linear demand model with unknown parameters. We assume that an incumbent price has been tested for n periods in the offline stage before the start of the selling horizon, and the seller has collected n demand observations under the incumbent price from the market. The seller wants to utilize both the pre-existing offline data and the sequential online data to minimize the regret of the online learning process.
Introduction
Classical statistical learning theory of offline learning deals with the problem of finding a predictive function based on the entire training dataset, with the goal of finding algorithms that have low generalization error or sample complexity bounds (see, e.g., Valiant 1984) . In contrast to the offline learning setting where the entire training dataset is directly available at the beginning, online learning deals with the setting where data become available in a sequential manner that may depend on the sequential actions of the algorithm, with the goal of finding algorithms that have low regret bounds. While offline learning assumes access to offline data (but not online data) and online learning assumes access to online data (but not offline data), in reality, a broad class of practical problems fall into the middle of these two problems: there is an offline historical dataset (based on historical actions) at the time that we study the problem, and the learner wants to develop an online learning policy (with sequential access to online data) from now on.
Currently, there is no standard framework for the above type of learning problems, as classical offline learning theory and online learning theory have different settings and goals. While establishing a framework that bridges all aspects of offline learning and online learning is generally a very complicated task, in this paper, we propose a novel framework that bridges the gap between offline learning and online learning in a specific problem setting, which, however, already captures the essence of many dynamic pricing problems that sellers face in reality.
The problem: online pricing with offline data
Consider a seller offering a single product with infinite amount of inventory over a selling horizon of T periods. Customer's demand for the product is determined by the price charged by the seller according to an underlying linear demand model. The seller knows neither the true demand parameters nor the distribution of random noise. However, we assume that before the seller decides to adopt dynamic pricing, she adopted a fixed pricing policy in the past -specifically, she posted a fixed price called the incumbent price for n periods and collected n demand observations from the market. (In other words, the seller has a pre-existing offline dataset consisting of n demand observations under the incumbent price before the start of online learning.) The seller's objective is to design learning algorithms that use both the offline data and the sales data collected on the fly to learn the unknown demand model while concurrently maximizing total revenue. The performance of the algorithm is measured by the regret of the online learning process, defined as the difference between the optimal revenue and the total revenue generated by the algorithm.
Literature of online learning in dynamic pricing
When there is no data available before the selling horizon, the problem we consider becomes the classic dynamic pricing under demand uncertainty, which has aroused great interest in recent years in the operations research and management science areas. Along this line of research, the fundamental issue is to balance the trade-off between pricing to form a good estimate of unknown parameters (exploration) and pricing to gain profit or revenue as much as possible (exploitation). Harrison et al. (2012) consider a Bayesian formulation with two hypotheses on demand models, and the customer's purchase behavior is generated from only one of them. They show that the myopic Bayesian policy can lead to incomplete learning, but under some additional assumption, some variant of myopic pricing can avoid using the uninformative price and achieve bounded regret as the number of customers increases. Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) consider single-product pricing under a general parametric demand model. They show the optimal regret of Θ( √ T ) by constructing a learning algorithm combining the maximum-likelihood estimation and the explicit price experimentation with O( √ T ) upper regret, and establishing a lower bound Ω( √ T ) on the worst-case regret any policy could achieve. Further, Broder and Rusmevichientong (2012) also prove that when the demand functions satisfy some "well-separated " condition, the optimal regret is Θ(log T ). den Boer and Zwart (2013) study the demand model with two unknown parameters, and propose the controlled variance pricing (CVP) policy by creating a taboo interval around the average of previously chosen prices to guarantee sufficient price dispersion. They show that under this policy the price will converge to the optimal price, and also derive theoretical bounds on the regret. den Boer (2014) also extends den Boer and Zwart (2013) to the multi-product setting.
However, all of these papers assume that there is no data available at the start of the selling horizon, and our paper bridges this gap by incorporating the offline data into the online decision making.
The work of Keskin and Zeevi (2014) is the most relevant to ours. They consider the setting of multiple products and unknown linear demand curves. Depending on whether the seller knows the expected demand under an incumbent price, Keskin and Zeevi (2014) prove that the best achievable regret is Θ( √ T ) and Θ(log T ) respectively. This paper is different from Keskin and Zeevi (2014) in several major aspects. First, from the modeling perspective, the problem considered in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) falls into the category of pure online learning, while our framework incorporates the offline data into the online pricing decisions. Second, due to the existence of offline data, we establish the algorithms' optimal regret, which depends not only on the horizon length, but also on the number of offline data. This leads to the phase transition of the optimal regret with respect to the offline data size, which is not discussed in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) since there is no such a quantity in their setting. Third, we characterize the effect of the shape of the offline data measured by the deviation of the incumbent price from the optimal price on the optimal regret, which follows the so-called inverse-square law.
Our contributions
Our main contributions are highlighted below.
Briding offline and online learning in dynamic pricing. In this paper, we propose a novel framework that incorporates offline data into online pricing problems. Our assumption of the offline data available before the seller makes pricing decision is very practical in real life, and this new formulation of the problem also leads to several interesting research questions. First, to what extent does the offline data help increase the seller's online revenue? Second, except for the size of the offline data, is there any other factor that affects the complexity of online learning task? As will be seen later, this paper provides nontrivial answers to these two questions, and reveal interesting phenomena which are overlooked in the previous literature from the traditional modeling approach.
Characterization on the optimal regret. We first establish a lower bound on the regret of
where δ is the absolute difference between the incumbent price and the optimal price. In the well-separated case where δ is lower bounded by a known constant, we provide sufficient conditions for a learning algorithm to achieve the regret of O ( √ T ∧ T n ) log T , which matches the lower bound up to a logarithm factor by treating δ as a constant in the lower bound. In the general case where δ is not necessarily lower bounded by a known constant, we develop a learning algorithm called O3FU algorithm based on the celebrated "optimism in the face of uncertainty" principle, and prove the regret of O ( log T δ 2 ∨ T nδ 2 ) ∧ √ T . This upper bound also matches the smallest achievable δ-dependent lower bound up to a logarithm factor. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the regret bounds in this paper and the existing literature for the purpose of comparison. In particular, the notation "f g" denotes "f = O(g)", and we use ∞ to denote the case when the expected demand under the incumbent price is known exactly to the seller, as considered in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) . . Table 1 Optimal regret in the well-separated case δ ≥ C min > 0
Offline sample size n = 0 0 < n T 
Implications of phase transition and inverse-square law. Based on our results of the optimal regret, we find two important implications which do not appear in the existing literature.
First, in both the well-separated and general cases, we observe the transformation of the optimal regret from one state to another as the number of offline data changes, which we call as the phase transition and illustrated in Figure 1 and 2. In the well-separated case, there are three phases defined by two thresholds of the offline sample size n, i.e., Θ( √ T ) and Θ(T ). When n = O( √ T ), the optimal regret remains at the level of Θ( √ T ). As the offline sample size increases before reaching Θ(T ), the optimal regret decays in n in the form of Θ(n −1 T ). When n = Ω(T ), the optimal regret attains Θ(log T ) and does not change any more. In the general case, however, we can see a clear dichotomy on the regrets depending on the magnitude of δ. When δ = Ω(T − 1 4 ), the optimal regret Offline sample size n = 0 0 < n δ −2 T 1 2
When the offline sample size keeps increasing, the optimal regret reaches the level of Θ(δ −2 log T ), and remains the same afterwards. However, if δ = O(T − 1 4 ), the optimal regret is always Θ(T 1 2 ), and increasing the offline data does not help improve the regret bound.
Second, in the general case, when n = O(δ −2 T 1 2 ) and δ = Ω(T − 1 4 ), we show that the optimal regret is proportional to δ −2 , which captures the intrinsic effect of the shape of the offline data on the complexity of online learning. Since the optimal regret is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the incumbent price and the optimal price, we call this as the inverse-square law. Seemingly counter-intuitively, this result shows that the closer the incumbent price is to the optimal one, the more difficult it is for the seller to learn the demand model and the greater revenue loss the seller will incur in the online stage.
Other related literature
Our paper is also related to the literature of multi-armed bandits (MAB). In the classical k-armed bandit problem, the decision maker chooses one of k arms in each round and observe random reward generated from an unknown distribution associated with the arm being played, with the goal of minimizing the regret, see Lattimore and Szepesvári (2018) for more references about this topic. In most of the literature in MAB (see Dani et al. 2008 , Rusmevichientong and Tsitsiklis 2010 , Abbasi-Yadkori et al. 2011 , Filippi et al. 2010 for some celebrated works), the decision maker is assumed to start from scratch and has no data available before sequentially pulling the arms. In contrast, there are also a few papers studying bandit problems in different settings where algorithms may utilize different types of historical information, see (2012) is the most relevant to this paper.
Shivaswamy and Joachims (2012) study the MAB problem with historical observations of the rewards collected before the learning algorithm starts. While their assumption on the offline data is very similar to ours, there are significant differences between the two papers in terms of model settings, main results and analytical techniques. First, Shivaswamy and Joachims (2012) study the MAB problem with discrete and finitely many arms, whereas our model is built on the literature of online pricing problems (see §1.2 for references), where the prices are continuous and infinitely many, and the rewards are quadratic with respect to prices. The properties and results for these two classes of problems are quite different, see e.g., den Boer (2015) . Second, under certain conditions on the optimality gap (i.e., the difference between the mean rewards of the best and the second-best arms), Shivaswamy and Joachims (2012) prove a regret upper bound that changes from O(log T )
to O(1) with Ω(log T ) amount of balanced data, with no regret lower bound proved and no phase transition identified. In comparison, we characterize the optimal regret via matching upper and lower bounds that range fromΘ( √ T ) to Θ(log T ), and figure out surprising phase transitions of the optimal regret rate as the offline sample size changes. Moreover, we characterize the impact of the shape of offline data on the optimal regret by deriving novel tight regret bounds that depend on a quantity δ, which is the distance between the optimal price and the incumbent price. This enables us to discover the elegant inverse square law, which does not appear in previous literature.
Third, while Shivaswamy and Joachims (2012) use a conventional approach in bandit literature to upper-bound the regret via the optimality gap, since we are bounding the regret via δ, we present fundamentally different regret analysis that may be of independent interest. In particular, we track the trajectory of the algorithm's pricing decisions and prove some nontrivial global properties based on induction arguments. Besides, our method also exploits the specific structure of the problem provided by the quadratic relationship between the rewards and prices.
As we point out before, this paper seeks to combine offline learning with online learning in dynamic pricing problems. The literature of online learning have been summarized in §1.2, and we next review the works on the offline learning in OR/MS literature. The topic of offline learning has been discussed in different contexts of operations management problems. These problems usually involves stochastic optimization in a data-driven setting. In particular, the approach of sample average approximation (SAA) is commonly adopted, which solves the optimization problem by replacing the unknown distribution by its empirical counterpart constructed from the historical samples. Intuitively, the optimal solution of the SAA problem will converge to that of the original problem as the sample size increases, and the main task is to derive an analytical bound on the probability that the SAA solution achieves a near optimal performance, and analyze how many samples are needed to guarantee a high accuracy with high probability. This natural approach motivates a line of research on the data-driven inventory control problems, see e.g., Levi et al. these papers assume that the decision maker cannot adjust her decisions by using any new data.
However, our paper assumes that the decision maker can make online pricing decisions based on both the offline and online data.
Structure and notations
Our paper is organized as follows. In §2, we formulate our problem. In §3, we develop a lower bound on the loss of expected revenue for any given pricing policy. In §4, we focus on the well-separated case and provide sufficient conditions under which an online learning algorithm could achieve the optimal regret. In §5, we consider the general case by constructing a learning algorithm called O3FU and prove the asymptotic optimality of this algorithm. Finally, we summarize our paper and discuss about an extension in §6. Most of the technical proofs are deferred to the Appendix.
Throughout the paper, all the vector are column vectors unless otherwise specified. For any x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ R n , we use || · || to denote the l 2 norm, i.e., ||x|| = (
, Ω(·) and Θ(·) are used by hiding the constant factors, and O(·), Ω(·) and Θ(·) are used by hiding constant factors and logarithmic factors. We use "a ∧ b" to denote "min{a, b}" and "a ∨ b" to denote "max{a, b}".
Model Formulation
Basic model. Consider a firm selling a single product with infinite amount of inventory over a time horizon of T periods. In each period 1 ≤ t ≤ T , the manager chooses a price p t from a given interval [l, u] ⊂ [0, ∞), and offers it to the customers. Then the seller observes the demand D t for period t. In this paper, we focus on the linear demand models: the demand in each period is a linear function of the price plus some random noise. More specifically, 
We define p * θ to be the price that maximizes the expected single-period revenue function r θ (p) over the interval [l, u] when the parameter is θ, which is also denoted as ψ(θ), i.e.,
We also assume that for any θ ∈ Θ, the optimal price is an interior point of the feasible set [l, u] .
Therefore, we have
Let r * θ be the optimal expected revenue, i.e., r * θ = p * θ (α + βp * θ ).
Incumbent price and offline data. In reality, the seller does not know the exact values of α and β, but needs to learn such information from the sales data. Most of the existing literature assume that no data is available at the beginning of online horizon, and the seller can only start data collection while making online decisions. In this paper, we consider a more practical case by assuming that the seller has collected some historical data from the offline stage, which can be used for online decision making. More specifically, we assume that the seller has tested a fixed pricê p ∈ [l, u] for n periods before making the online pricing decisions, and collected n demand samples from the market, denoted asD 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D n . We assume that these data are generated according to the demand model in (1), then for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
random variables.p is called as the incumbent price. We also define δ as the absolute difference between the incumbent price and the optimal price, i.e., δ = |p − p * |.
The seller can use the offline data as well as the data generated on the fly to estimate the unknown parameters.
As reviewed in §1.4, Keskin and Zeevi (2014) also consider the incumbent-price problem for the same linear demand model. They assume that the expected demand under the incumbent price, called as incumbent demand, is known by the seller exactly. In reality, although the seller could estimate the incumbent demand by charging the incumbent price for many times to collect demand samples, the exact value of the incumbent demand can never be known, and there is no guarantee of how the estimation error affects the optimal regret. Instead, we assume that the seller does not know the exact incumbent demand, but has access to the demand samples collected from the offline stage, which is more realistic and commonly adopted in practice. Further, it also leads to some important questions which are overlooked in the previous literature and will be studied in this paper.
Information structure, pricing policies, and performance metrics. For each t ≥ 0, let H t be the vector of information available at the end of period t, i.e., H t = (p,D 1 , . . . ,D n , p 1 , D 1 , . . . , p t , D t ). Note that when t = 0, the only information available is just the incumbent price and offline data. A pricing policy is defined as a sequence of functions π = (π 1 , π 2 , . . .), where π t+1 : R n+1+2t → [l, u] is a measurable function which maps the information vector H t to a feasible price. Therefore, the policy π generates a price sequence (p 1 , p 2 , . . .) with each p t adapted to H t−1 .
Let R π θ (p, n, T ) be the expected T -period revenue of the seller under the pricing policy, i.e.,
where the inner-layer expectation is taken over demand uncertainty in the online learning stage, and the outer-layer expectation is taken over offline demand observations. The regret is defined as
which is gap between the expected revenue under the clairvoyant policy that knows the exact values of θ at the beginning of period 1 with the expected revenue generated by the pricing policy π. The firm's objective is to find a pricing policy that minimizes the regret.
Lower Bound
To derive the lower bound, we consider the case of ǫ t ∼ N (0, σ 2 ). Recall that at the end of each period t, all the available information is contained in the history vector H t . Given the demand
where φ(·) is the density function for standard normal distribution. It is easy to verify that
, and the Fisher information matrix equals
where
For any compact parameter set Θ, price interval [l, u] , fixed σ > 0, and incumbent pricep ∈ [l, u], there exists an absolute constant K 1 such that for any algorithm π,δ ∈ (0, u − l), T ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1,
Theorem 1 provides a lower bound on the regret that any algorithm could achieve. Since we consider the offline sales data, the lower bound we develop depends on the horizon length T , the sample size of offline data n and the value ofδ. In particular, ifδ is a known constant, the RHS of (9) becomes Ω( √ T ) and Ω(log T ) when n = 0 and ∞ respectively, corresponding to Theorems 1 and 3 in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) respectively. In addition, the RHS of (9) can be considered as the instance-dependent lower bound since it also depends onδ, which is in contrast to the instanceindependent lower bound in Theorem 3 of Keskin and Zeevi (2014) . Such dependence is especially important when |p − p * | is close to zero. Similar to Keskin and Zeevi (2014) , the proof of Theorem 1 is based on the multivariate van Trees inequality, which is provided in the Appendix A.
Upper Bound: Well-separated Case
In this section, we consider the well-separated case: there exists a positive lower bound on the absolute difference between the incumbent price and the optimal price, which is known to the seller at the start of the selling horizon. That is, we assume that there exists C min > 0 such that the seller knows the absolute difference between the incumbent price and the optimal price is greater than
Least squares estimation
We first introduce the definition of least squares estimator by considering two cases: n = Ω(T ) and n = O(T ), where we take slightly different approaches in the estimation procedure.
Case 1: n = Ω(T ). In this case, since the number of historical data is large, we can simply approximate the true expected demandD under the incumbent pricep with the sample average of historical dataD 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D n . LetD n be the average demand under the incumbent pricep, i.e.,
Then the demand function can be approximated byD n + β(p −p). The motivation to this approximation is as follows. When n is very large, the empirical meanD n will be close toD with high probability, and from the concentration inequality, the cumulative loss due to this approximation will not be too large. In addition, the problem will reduce to the single-parameter estimation, which is easier compared with the original one. By assuming that with probability one,D n − βp ∈ [α min , α max ] for any β ∈ [β min , β max ], we have
Given the history of demand and prices available at the end of period t, the least squares estimator β t,n is obtained based on the approximate demand functionD n + β(p −p), i.e.,
Letβ t,n be the projection ofβ t,n to the set [β min , β max ], i.e., β t,n = (β t,n ∧ β max ) ∨ β min . It is easy to verify thatβ
Let ϕ n (β t,n ) be the greedy pricing policy based on the approximate demand functionD n +β t,n (p −
Case 2: n = O(T ). When the offline sample size is smaller than the length of the selling horizon, approximating the incumbent priceD with the empirical mean may lead to large estimation error.
In this case, we compute the least squares estimator using both the offline and online sales data.
More specifically, letθ t,n = (α t,n ,β t,n ) be defined as follows:
It is easy to verify that
For notational convenience, let
Therefore,θ t,n − θ = J −1 t,n M t,n . In addition, let θ t,n = ( α t,n , β t,n ) be the projection of (α t,n ,β t,n ) to the compact set Θ, i.e., ( α t,n , β t,n ) = arg min θ∈Θ ||θ −θ t,n || 2 2 .
We also define ψ(θ) as the optimal price under the parameter θ, i.e., ψ(θ) = − α 2β . Note that ψ(θ) is Lipschitz continuous in the parameter vector θ ∈ Θ, and for any θ 1 , θ 2 ∈ Θ,
Sufficient conditions for asymptotic optimality
Now, we are ready to state our main results in this section, which are presented in two separate cases: when n = Ω(T ) and when n = O( √ T ).
Theorem 2. Suppose δ = |p − p * | ≥ C min > 0 and n = Ω(T ). Then there exist some positive constants κ 0 , κ 1 > 0 depending on C min and the supports of α, β and p, and an absolute constant K 2 independent of n, T, δ, such that if a pricing policy satisfies
almost surely for any t ≥ 1, then
Theorem 2 shows that when n = Ω(T ), and an algorithm satisfies the two conditions (i)-(ii), then the regret is O(log T ), which matches the lower bound in our Theorem 1. The intuition of this result is as follows. When the sample size of offline data is sufficiently large, the sample averageD n is very close to the true mean demandD, and replacingD withD n in the demand function does not incur an additional revenue loss compared with the case whenD is known exactly, where the optimal regret is Θ(log T ). In addition, the sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 are similar to those in Theorem 4 of Keskin and Zeevi (2014), which require that (i) the information is accumulated at an adequate rate of log t (exploration); (ii) the cumulative deviation from the myopic price is not too large and less than the order of log t (exploitation).
Theorem 3. Suppose δ = |p − p * | ≥ C min > 0, and n = Θ(T a ) with 1 2 < a < 1. There exist some constants κ 0 , κ 1 > 0 depending on C min and the supports of α, β and p, and an absolute constant
Theorem 3 shows that when n = Θ(T a ) for some 1 2 < a < 1 and an algorithm satisfies the condition (i)-(ii), then the regret bound is O( T nδ 2 log T ), which matches the lower bound in Theorem 1 up to a logarithm factor. Compared with the conditions in Theorem 2, those given in Theorem 3 put more emphasis on the exploration, and less emphasis on the exploitation. This is intuitive since when the offline sample size is small, the seller does not gain much information about the demand parameters and needs to spend more efforts in exploration by deviating from the average price and increasing the variability of the prices adopted in the past. We also want to mention that in the proof, we actually show that for any algorithm satisfying conditions (i)-(ii), when t ≥ T a , the sum over the squared deviation of all prices charged in offline and online stages, defined as
increases at the order of t a with high probability.
Similar to Keskin and Zeevi (2014), we can construct algorithms by modifying the greedy policy such that conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2 or Theorem 3 are satisfied. As an example, we describe an algorithm satisfying sufficient conditions in Theorem 2 when n = Ω(T ), and a similar approach can be applied to construct algorithms satisfying conditions in Theorem 3 for n = Θ(T a ) with 1 2 < a < 1. Following the terminology in Keskin and Zeevi (2014), we call this policy as the constrained iterated least squares (CILS). In the first period, CILS charges an arbitrary price between [l, u] . In each period t ≥ 2, let ρ t = ϕ n ( β t−1,n ) −p t−1 , and CILS charges the price
CILS can be considered as a variant of the greedy policy with additional perturbation. It is easy to verify that the above CILS algorithm satisfies two the conditions in Theorem 2, which is provided in the Appendix.
Implication: phase transitions
Combining our Theorems 2 and 3, and Theorem 2 in Keskin and Zeevi (2014), the optimal regret in the well-separated case is
Since C min is a known constant, the scale of C min is much smaller than n and T , and the inequality (15) simply becomes inf π sup θ∈Θ:|p−p * |≥C min
The above inequality (16) implies that the optimal regret transforms from Θ( √ T ) to Θ(log T ) as the offline sample size increases from O( √ T ) to Ω(T ). As illustrated in Figure 1 , there are three phases defined by two thresholds of the offline sample size n. When n = O( √ T ), the optimal regret is always Θ( √ T ), which demonstrates that increasing the offline sample size in this regime does not help improve the optimal regret. Therefore, from the managerial perspective, if the seller wants to do experiments on a fixed price in the offline stage to gain preliminary information about the market, the length of the experiment horizon must be at least Ω( √ T ), since otherwise, there is no improvement in terms of the regret bound. As the offline sample size increases before reaching Θ(T ), the optimal regret decays in n in the form of Θ(n −1 T ). For example, when n = O(T 2 3 ), the optimal regret will be Θ(T 1 3 ). In this case, increasing the sample size of offline data helps improve the regret drastically, and the more data the firm has, the smaller regret a well-designed algorithm could achieve. When n = Ω(T ), the optimal regret attains Θ(log T ) and does not change any more.
In particular, in the extreme case when n = ∞, the incumbent demandD is exactly known to the firm, the optimal regret is Θ(log T ), which is consistent with the result in Keskin and Zeevi (2014).
Therefore, from the managerial perspective, in order to gain more revenue in the online stage and achieve the best regret O(log T ), it suffices to test the incumbent price offline for Θ(T ) periods, which already gives the optimal regret Θ(log T ).
Upper Bound: General Case
In Section 4, we assume that δ is lower bounded by some known constant C min > 0, which, however, may fail in reality due to the following reasons. First, in practice, the seller will never know the expected demand under the incumbent price exactly, and therefore, it can never obtain an exact lower bound on δ = |p − p * |. Second, although the seller can choose a sufficiently small C min such that δ > C min with high probability, the coefficients of δ −4 and δ −2 in the upper bound of (15) will become very large and may dominate other terms, e.g., log T and T n . In this case, the inequality (16) does not capture the exact optimal regret. Third, in some scenarios, the incumbent price tested in the offline stage may be very close to the true optimal price. For example, the seller may estimate a near-optimal price based on large volumes of historical data of similar products from the previous selling horizons. If the market is very stable and the demand models for the reference products have similar shapes to the current product, the estimation may be very accurate and the gap betweenp and p * is very small. In this case, the effect of δ −4 and δ −2 in the upper bound of (15) will also dominate the effect of log T and T n .
Due to the above reasons, in this section, we consider a general case where δ is not necessarily lower bounded by a known constant. We will address the following two questions. First, can we improve Theorems 2 and 3 by designing a parameter-free algorithm which does not use the knowledge of any lower bound of δ? Note that the constants κ 0 and κ 1 in Theorems 2 and 3 depend on the lower bound C min . Second, what is the intrinsic effect of δ on the optimal regret bound? Note that in our previous Section 4, when n = Ω(T ), the regret of our algorithms is O( log T δ 4 ), which does not match the lower bound O( log T δ 2 ) in Theorem 1.
O3FU algorithm and asymptotic optimality
In this section, we propose an Online and Offline Optimism in the Face of Uncertainty (O3FU) algorithm, whose construction is based on the celebrated "optimism in the face of uncertainty"
(OFU) principle. The pseudo-code of O3FU algorithm is provided in Algorithm 1. For analytical tractability, we assume that ǫ t is an R-sub-Gaussian random variable, i.e., E[e xǫ t ] ≤ e
x 2 R 2 2
for any
Algorithm 1: O3FU Algorithm
Input: incumbent pricep, offline demand dataD 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D n , support of unknown
Charge the price p t , and observe demand realization D t ;
We explain O3FU algorithm as follows. For each period t ≥ 2, we first maintain a confidence set C t−1 which will be proved to contain the true demand parameter θ with high probability.
The algorithm then selects an optimistic estimatorθ t = arg max θ∈C t−1 ∩Θ max p∈ [l,u] p(α + βp), and charges the price p t = arg max p∈[l,u] p(α t +β t p), which is optimal with respect to the estimatorθ t . This is equivalent to joint maximization of the revenue over (p, θ) ∈ [l, u] × (C t−1 ∩ Θ) as described in the above Algorithm 1. If our estimation ofθ t is far away from the true parameter θ, the algorithm will be forced to choose other prices in the next periods, but if our estimation ofθ t is close to θ, we will be able to exploit and reduce the revenue loss. Therefore, the O3FU algorithm will automatically strike a balance between the exploration and exploitation, which makes it easy to explain to the manager and to implement in practice. In addition, compared with the CILS algorithm described in Section 4 and other variants of the greedy policy, the O3FU algorithm does not use the information of any lower bound on δ, making it more applicable in reality.
The following theorem characterizes the regret bound of the above O3FU algorithm.
Theorem 4. Suppose ǫ t are R-subgaussian random variables. Let π be the above O3FU algorithm.
Then there exists an absolute constant K 4 > 0 independent of T , n and δ such that
We next elaborate on Theorem 4. Recall that from Theorem 1, the best achievable regret bound of any policy is of order
, the regret bound of O3FU algorithm stays at the order of √ T log(T + n), and the lower bound in Theorem 1 is Ω( √ T ). As n increases from Ω(δ −2 √ T ) to Θ(T ), the regret bound of O3FU decreases from the order of √ T log(T + n) to δ −2 n −1 T log(T + n), and the lower bound in Theorem 1 drops from Ω( √ T ) to Ω((δ −2 n −1 T ) ∨ log T ). Once n increases to Ω(T ), the regret of O3FU stays at the level of δ −2 log(T + n), and the lower bound in Theorem 1 becomes Ω(δ −2 ∨ log T ). In all the above three cases, the regret of the O3FU algorithm matches the order of the lower bound in Theorem 1 up to a logarithm factor. When δ = o(T − 1 4 ), regardless of the offline sample size n, the regret of the O3FU algorithm is always of the order √ T log(T + n), which also matches the lower bound Ω( √ T ) in Theorem 1 by ignoring a logarithm factor. Therefore, the O3FU algorithm is provably asymptotically optimal and achieves the best regret bound. Finally, we also want mention that, in the incumbent price setting considered by Keskin and Zeevi (2014), i.e., n = ∞, the regret in our Theorem 2 and Theorem 4 of Keskin and Zeevi (2014) are both proportional to δ −4 , while the one in our Theorem 4 is proportional to δ −2 , which cannot be further improved as it matches the lower bound in Theorem 1.
Implications: phase transitions and the inverse-square law
In contrast to the well-separated case where the phenomena of phase transitions do not depend on the value of δ, in the general case, the number of phases of the optimal regret and the thresholds of the offline sample size which define different phases depend heavily on the magnitude of δ. As illustrated in Figure 2 , when δ = Ω(T − 1 4 ), similar to the well-separated case, there are three phases defined by two thresholds of offline sample size, with the first threshold of Θ(δ −2 √ T ) between Θ( √ T ) and Θ(T ), and the second threshold of Θ(T ). It is worth noting that the first threshold in the general case is greater than that in the well-separated case. However, when δ is very close to zero with δ = O(T − 1 4 ), there is no phase transition, and the optimal regret is always Θ( √ T ).
Seemingly counter-intuitively, this shows that the closer the incumbent price is to the optimal price, the more difficult it is to learn the demand parameters. This can be explained as follows.
In the presence of offline sales data under the incumbent price, a good algorithm needs to deviate from the incumbent price for exploration. However, when δ is extremely small, such deviation will also lead to the deviation from the optimal price and greater revenue loss, which explains why the optimal regret does not change when δ = o(T − 1 4 ).
Further more, we also quantify the intrinsic effect of the difference between the incumbent price and the optimal price on the optimal regret, which can be stated in the inverse-square law. More specifically, when δ = Ω(T − 1 4 ) and n = Ω(δ −2 √ T ), the optimal regret is of the order Θ(( T n ∨ 1) log T δ 2 ), which is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between the incumbent price and the optimal price. In particular, even in the case when the expected demand under the incumbent price is known to the seller exactly, the optimal regret is still Θ( log T δ 2 ), which grows quadratically as δ decreases. Therefore, the term δ −2 is intrinsic in the regret bound even for any algorithm. We call such dependence of the optimal regret on δ −2 as the inverse-square law.
Proof of Theorem 4
5.3.1. Construction of confidence sets As preparations, we first need to establish confidence sets for the least square estimator. We borrow the result from Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011), which is stated in the following Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 (Theorem 2 in Abbasi-Yadkori et al. 2011). For any 0 < ǫ < 1,
Regret analysis of O3FU algorithm
We are now ready to prove Theorem 4. Since Theorem 4 states that the O3FU algorithm achieves the regret bound of the smaller one between O( √ T ) and O( T n(p * −p) 2 ), we will divide the proof into two steps to prove the results of O( √ T log(T + n)) and O( T log(T +n) n(p * −p) 2 ) respectively.
Step 1. In this step, we prove that the regret of the O3FU algorithm is O( √ T log(T + n)). Let
x t = [1 p t ] T for each t ≥ 1. For any t ≥ 2, suppose θ ∈ C t−1 , then we have
where the first inequality follows from the definition of (p t ,θ) in O3FU algorithm, and the second inequality follows from p t ∈ [l, u] and triangle inequality, and the last inequality follows fromθ t ∈
where the first inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, and the second inequality follows from the inequality (17) and the fact that w t increases in t. Next, we need to introduce an existing result from Abbasi-Yadkori et al. (2011), which will be used to bound the term
To apply the above Lemma 2, we let d = 2, L = √ 1 + u 2 , λ ≥ 1 + u 2 ,
which, combined with the inequality (18) and the definition of w T , implies that ∆ π (p, n, T ) = O( √ T log(T + n)).
Step 2. In this step, we prove that the regret of the O3FU algorithm is O( T log(T +n) n(p * −p) 2 ). We will focus on the case when n ≤ T and |p − p * | ≥ w T n 1/4 . Otherwise, either 1 δ 2 ∨ T nδ 2 = 1 δ 2 (then by only using T offline samples the O3FU achieves the bound in Theorem 4), or
(then by the step 1 above we directly prove the bound).
Note that
where the inequality follows from (14). We only need bound the term ||θ −θ t || 2 for each t ≥ 1, whose proof is based on the following lemma.
Lemma 3. Suppose for each t ≥ 1, the true parameter θ belongs to the confidence set C t , i.e., θ ∈ C t , then the sequence of events {U t,1 : t ≥ 2} and {U t,2 : t ≥ 1} must also hold, where
Lemma 3 shows that as long as θ belongs to the confidence set C t for each t ≥ 1, the l 2 -norm distance between the true parameter θ and the estimator obtained in each step from the principle of the optimism in the face of uncertainty, i.e.,θ t , will also be upper bounded. In addition, the distance between the incumbent pricep and the price p t generated from the algorithm will also be at lest some constant times the distance between the incumbent pricep and the optimal price p * .
The proof of Lemma 3 comes from induction arguments, which are provided in the Appendix.
With the above result, Theorem 4 can be proved using the following arguments.
where the first inequality follows from Lemmas 3 and 1, the second inequality follows from the definition of U t,1 and δ = 1/(2T ).
Conclusion
In this paper, we provide a novel framework that bridges the gap between offline learning and online learning in the context of dynamic pricing. In contrast to previous literature that involves only offline data (collected before the selling horizon) or only online data (collected during the selling horizon), we consider a challenging problem that involves both offline data and online data, aiming to understand whether and how the prior-existence of offline data would benefit the online learning process. In both the well-separated and general cases, we prove matching upper and lower bounds for the optimal regret and propose near-optimal learning algorithms. As two important implications, we discover phase transitions and the inverse-square law, which characterize the effect of the size and shape of the offline data on the behavior of the optimal regret respectively.
Our approach can be extended to a more general setting with multiple incumbent prices in the offline data. When the offline data consist of a vector of demand samples (D 1 ,D 2 , . . . ,D n ) under a vector of incumbent prices (p 1 ,p 2 , . . . ,p n ), wherep 1 ,p 2 , . . . ,p n are not necessarily identical, we can derive a similar lower bound on the optimal regret, and obtain a matching upper bound by using the O3FU algorithm. In particular, a generalized version of the phase transitions and the inverse-square law discovered in this paper still exist the new setting. Let q(·) be the density function for the unknown parameter θ supported over Θ(p,δ), taking zero at the boundary and positive values at the interior points. For notational convenience, let C(θ) = [−ψ(θ) 1] T . From the multivariate van Trees inequality, for any t ≥ 2, we have
where I(q) is the Fisher information function for the density q. Note that we can choose q appropriately such that I(q) is independent ofδ, e.g., when q(·) is the density for uniform distribution,
and in addition,
where the first inequality follows from the definition of q(·). Combining the inequalities (EC.1), (EC.2) and (EC.3), for each t ≥ 2, we have
.
Let c 0 = σ 2 α 2 min /(4β 2 min ), c 1 = σ 2 I(q), and a π (t) = sup θ∈Θ(p,δ) t s=1 E π θ [(p s − ψ(θ)) 2 ] . By noting that {a π (t) : t ≥ 1} is an increasing sequence, we have
which implies that there exists some constant c 2 independent of π, T, n,δ such that for any T ≥ 2,
Therefore, for any algorithm π, any T ≥ 2 and n ≥ 1, we have
In addition, since the incumbent price problem in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) where the second inequality follows from Theorem 3 in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) . In addition, let q ′ be an absolutely continuous density on {β ∈ [β min , β max ] : |D 2β −p 2 | ≤δ} such that I(q ′ ) is independent ofδ. From the univariate van Trees inequality, we have
By letting q ′ (·) be the density function for uniform distribution, then I(q ′ ) = 0. We also let
By summing the above inequality from t = 2 to T , we have
e-companion to Author: Article Short Title ec3 Note that
Therefore, from (EC.6), we have
where the second inequality follows from Step 1. Decomposition of the regret. Note that
So the regret is decomposed into two parts: the difference between the true optimal policy and the myopic policy, and the difference between the myopic policy and the semi-myopic policy. From condition (ii) in Theorem 2, it suffices to bound
On the summation of the first term in (EC.8), we have
On the summation of the second term in (EC.8), by the definition of ϕ n (·),
Therefore, it suffices to bound the term
Step 2. Several technical lemmas. In this step, we establish several technical lemmas that will be used in Step 3. We defer the proofs of these lemmas to the next subsections.
The first lemma shows that if |D n −D| is close to zero, then the least squares estimator of β based on the approximate functionD n + β(p −p) will be close to that based on the true demand function. This lemma is proved using Hoeffding's inequality, and we defer the detailed proof to Appendix B.2.
Lemma EC.1. Consider any algorithm satisfying the conditions (i)-(ii) in Theorem 2. Then for any η > 0 and t ≥ 3, the following inequality holds:
The next lemma characterizes the relationship between the estimation error based on the true demand function and the accumulated information. The proof of this lemma is similar to Lemma 5 established in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) , which is therefore omitted.
Lemma EC.2. There exists a constant ρ such that for any pricing policy π, P(|β t − β| > η,Ĵ t ≥ m) ≤ 2 exp(−ρ(η ∧ η 2 )m), ∀η, m > 0, ∀t ≥ 2.
(EC.10) e-companion to Author: Article Short Title ec5
The following lemma shows thatĴ t increase linearly in t with high probability. Keskin and Zeevi (2014) establish a similar result in the incumbent price setting. However, the proof of our result is more complicated and cannot be directly implied from theirs since the deviation |D n −D| creates additional difficulty in the analysis. The proof of this result is provided in Appendix B.3.
Lemma EC.3. For each t ≥ 3, let A t,1 , A t,2 and A t,3 be the following three events,
In addition, suppose for t ≥ N (β,p), A t holds under some δ 1 = 1 20 |β max |(u − l), δ 2 = 1 √ 20 |βmax| Dmax |ϕ(β) − p| and δ 3 = |βmax| 5 √ 2Dmax |ϕ(β) −p|, then the following event always holds:
Lemma EC.3 implies that when κ 0 and κ 1 satisfies 1
3 ) , and n ≥ (D max − D min ) 2 δ 2 1 T , where δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 are defined in Lemma EC.3, there exists some constant C such that
Step 3. Upper bound on
On the first term in the last inequality of (EC.13), we have for any N ≤ t ≤ T ,
e-companion to Author: Article Short Title where the identity follows from the definition ofβ t , the first inequality follows from the inequality (EC.11) in Lemma EC.3. This implies that
On the second term in the last inequality of (EC.13), we have for any N ≤ t ≤ T ,
where the first identity follows from the definitions ofβ t andβ t,n , and the inequality follows from (EC.11) in Lemma EC.3. Therefore,
). The proof of Theorem 2 is completed. Q.E.D.
B.2. Proof of Lemma EC.1
Suppose the event |D n −D| ≤ log t t η holds, then we have
where the first inequality follows from J t |p t −p| + t|p t −p| ≥ 2 √ tJ t , and the last inequality follows from the condition (i) in Theorem 2. Therefore, we have
where the identity follows from the above discussion, and the inequality follows from the Hoeffding's inequality. Q.E.D.
B.3. Proof of Lemma EC.3
so it suffices to show that
(EC.15)
We now prove the first inequality (EC.14). Note that
which implies that
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, the second inequality follows from the choice of κ 0 ≥ δ 2 1 4δ 2 2 , and the last inequality follows from Lemma EC.1.
We now prove that the inequality (EC.15).
where the first inequality follows from the union bound, the second identity follows from the definition of the semi-myopic policy andĴ t ≥ J t for any t ≥ 1, the second inequality follows from Lemma EC.2, and the third inequality holds by the choice of κ 0 ≥ 3 ρ(δ 3 ∧δ 2 3 ) . Finally, note that
Suppose the event A t holds, then we have
Therefore, when t is sufficiently large, by choosing sufficiently small δ 1 , δ 2 and δ 3 , we get
Q.E.D.
Appendix C. Proof of Theorem 3 in Section 4 C.1. The Main Proof of Theorem 3
Since n = Θ(T a ) for some 1 2 < a < 1, there exist some constants N 0 and N 1 independent of T such that N 0 T a ≤ n ≤ N 1 T a for any T ≥ 1. Our proof will be divided into three major steps.
Step 1. Decomposition of regret. Given the parameter vector θ and any pricing policy π, we have the following upper bound on the regret: 
Step 2. Two technical lemmas. In this step, we introduce two technical lemmas that will be used later. For notational convenience, letp t,n and J t,n be defined as
Therefore,p t,n is the average price charged in both offline and online stages, and J t,n is the cumulative squared price deviations fromp t,n , and measures the information collected by the seller at the end of period t.
The following lemma states that the least squares estimation errors decrease exponentially fast in the information metric J t,n . The proof of this lemma is similar to that of Lemma 3 in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) , and is therefore omitted.
Lemma EC.4. There exist finite positive constants ρ and k such that for any pricing policy,
Note that since the estimatorθ t,n is obtained from t + n data points, the coefficient in the upper bound in the above lemma equals t + n instead of t in Lemma 3 in Keskin and Zeevi (2014) .
The following lemma shows that for any policy satisfying the conditions (i)-(ii) in Theorem 3, J t,n will increase at least of the order t a with high probability. The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix C.2.
Lemma EC.5. Let κ 0 and κ 1 in Theorems 3 be defined as
where ρ is the constant in Lemma EC.4. For each t ≥ T 1−a , let B t be the following event
For any algorithm π satisfying the conditions (i)-(ii) in Theorem 3, if the event B t holds, then we must have
In addition, there exists some constant C, such that
e-companion to Author: Article Short Title
Step 3. Upper bound on T t=1 E ||θ − θ t,n || 2 . With the above two lemmas, we are ready to bound the summation T t=1 E ||θ − θ t,n || 2 . To this end, we will show the following two identities respectively:
We first prove (EC.20). Note that from Lemma EC.5, we have
where the last identity follows from the inequality (EC.19) in Lemma EC.5. In addition, since
, the identity (EC.20) holds. We then prove (EC.21). Note that for each t ≥ T 1−a ,
where the first inequality follows from ||θ − θ t,n || ≤ ||θ −θ t,n || and Lemma EC.5. By applying the inequality in Lemma EC.4, we have
Note that when x is very small, the RHS of the above inequality can be larger than 1. Let x 0 be the value such that the RHS of the above inequality equals one, i.e.,
We now consider x 0 ≤ 1. A similar approach is applied when x 0 > 1, and is therefore omitted.
P ||θ −θ s,n || ≥ 2 3(1 + α 2 max /β 2 max ) |β max | · |ψ(θ) −p|, J s,n ≥ κ 0 log s e-companion to Author: Article Short Title
where the second inequality follows from the inequality (14) and ||θ − θ s,n || ≤ ||θ −θ s,n ||, the first identity follows from the condition (i) in Theorem 3, the third inequality follows from the fact that 
the sixth inequality holds since for each t ≥ T 1−a and ⌊ t 2 ⌋ ≤ s ≤ t, n ≤ N 1 T a ≤ N 1 (2s) a 1−a and s + n ≤ (N 1 + 1)(2s) a 1−a , and the last inequality follows from the fact the choice of κ 0 such that
Appendix D. CILS Algorithm in Section 4
We now verify that the CILS algorithm defined above satisfy the conditions (i) and (ii) in Theorem 2. Note that J t has the following equivalent expression: J t = t s=2 (1 − 1 s )(p s −p s−1 ) 2 . Then to verify the condition (i), it suffices to show that for each t ≥ 2, |p t −p t−1 | ≥ √ 2κ 0 (t − 1) − 1 2 . (EC.28)
If |ρ t | ≤ 2 √ κ 0 t − 1 2 , from the definition of p t , the inequality (EC.28) is satisfied. If |ρ t | > 2 √ κ 0 t − 1 2 , we have
Therefore, condition (i) is satisfied. To verify condition (ii), it suffices to show that for each t ≥ 2, |ϕ n ( β t−1,n ) − p t | ≤ √ κ 1 t − 1 2 . (EC.29)
If |δ t | > 2 √ κ 0 t − 1 2 , from the definition of p t , the inequality (EC.29) is satisfied. If |ρ t | ≤ 2 √ κ 0 t − 1 2 , we have |ϕ n ( β t−1,n ) − p t | = |ϕ n ( β t−1,n ) −p t−1 − sign(ρ t ) √ 2κ 0 (t − 1) − 1 2 |
e-companion to Author: Article Short Title where the last inequality follows from the choice of κ 0 and κ 1 . Q.E.D.
Appendix E. Proof of Lemma 3 in Section 5
When t = 1, since p 1 = u · I{p > u+l 2 } + l · I{p ≤ u+l 2 },we have |p 1 − p * | ≥ δ. Also, U s,1 holds.
Suppose for each 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1, the events U s,1 and U s,2 hold. Then we bound ||θ t − θ|| 2 and |p t −p|. For notational convenience, let ∆α t =α t − α, ∆β t =β t − β, and when ∆β t = 0, let γ t = ∆α t ∆β t . Since θ ∈ C t−1 andθ t ∈ C t−1 , we have ||θ t − θ|| 2 V t−1,n ≤ 2 ||θ t − θ|| 2 V t−1,n + ||θ t − θ|| 2 V t−1,n ≤ 2w 2 t−1 .
Expressing ||θ t − θ|| 2 V t−1,n in an explicit form, we have λ (∆α t ) 2 + (∆β t ) 2 + n ∆α t + ∆β tp 2 + t−1 s=1 ∆α t + ∆β t p s 2 ≤ 2w 2 t−1 .
(EC.30)
We will divide the proof into three cases by assuming ∆β ≥ 0. If ∆β < 0, the proof is similar to Case 2 and Case 3, and is therefore omitted for simplicity.
Case 1: ∆β t = 0. In this case, (EC.30) becomes ∆α 2 t (λ + n + t − 1) ≤ w 2 t−1 , which implies that ||θ −θ t || 2 = (∆α t ) 2 + (∆β t ) 2 = (∆α t ) 2 ≤ w 2 t−1 λ + n + t − 1 , (EC.31)
In addition,
where the second inequality follows from the inequalities (14) and (EC.31).
Case 2: ∆β t = 0, |γ t | ≥ 4u + 1. In this case, it is easy to verify that (γ t + 2p) 2 ≥ (|γ t | − 2p) 2 ≥ (2p + 1) 2 ≥ 2p 2 + 1, which implies that 1 + γ 2 t ≤ 2(γ t +p) 2 . Therefore, we have
where the first inequality follows from (EC.30). In addition,
where the second inequality follows from (14) and (EC.32).
Case 3: ∆β t = 0, |γ t | < 4u + 1. In this case, for notational convenience, we let C = l|β max | u|β min | , C 1 = C 1 + (4u + 1) 2 2(C + 1) .
e-companion to Author: Article Short Title ec15 Subcase 3.1: 1 + γ 2 t ≤ C 1 (γ t +p) 2 (p−p * ) 2 . In this subcase, we have ||θ −θ t || 2 ≤ w 2 t−1 (1 + γ 2 t ) λ(1 + γ 2 t ) + n(γ t +p) 2 ≤ C 1 w 2 t−1 C 1 λ + n(p − p * ) 2 ≤ C 1 w 2 t−1 C 1 λ + ((t − 1) ∧ n)(p − p * ) 2 , and |p t −p| ≥ |p * −p| − |p t − p * | ≥ |p * −p| − C 1 (α 2 max + β 2 max ) 4β 2
where in the fourth inequality we utilize the fact that δ ≥ w T n 1/4 . Subcase 3.2: 1 + γ 2 t > C 1 (γ t +p) 2 (p−p * ) 2 . In this subcase, we have ||θ −θ t || 2 = (∆β t ) 2 (γ 2 t + 1) ≤ 2w 2 t−1 (γ 2 t + 1) λ(γ 2 t + 1) + n(γ t +p) 2 + t−1 s=1 (γ t + p s ) 2 ≤ 4w 2 t−1 (γ 2 t + 1) (t−1)∧n s=1 (p s −p) 2 ≤ 1 4 4w 2 t−1 ((4u + 1) 2 + 1) ((t − 1) ∧ n)(p * −p) 2 , where the first inequality follows from (EC.30), the last inequality follows from inductive assumption: for each 1 ≤ s ≤ t − 1, |p s −p| ≥ K 6 |p * −p|. Now, it suffices to bound the term |p t −p|. If we can prove the following inequality: |γ t + p t | ≥ C|γ t + p * |, (EC.33) the remaining proof can be completed as follows.
|p t −p| ≥ |p t + γ t | − |γ t +p| ≥ C|γ t + p * | − |γ t +p| ≥ C(|p * −p| − |γ t +p|) − |γ t +p| = C|p * −p| − (C + 1)|γ t +p| ≥ C − (C + 1) 1 + (4u + 1) 2 C 1 |p * −p| ≥ C 2 |p * −p|, ec16 e-companion to Author: Article Short Title where the second inequality follows from (EC.33), the fourth inequality follows from the original assumption of Subcase 3.2, i.e., 1 + γ 2 t > C 1 (γ t +p) 2 (p−p * ) 2 and |γ t | ≤ 4u + 1, and the last inequality follows from the choice of C 1 .
Finally, we prove the inequality (EC.33). To facilitate discussion, we define A 1 = p t (α t +β t p t ), A 2 = p t (α + βp t ), A 3 = p * (α t +β t p * ), A 4 = p * (α + βp * ).
Recall that p t and p * are the optimizers in the corresponding maximization problems, i.e., p t = arg max p∈ [l,u] p(α t +βp), p * = arg max p∈ [l,u] p(α + βp), then we have the following relationships for A i for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4:
In order to show the inequality (EC.33), we consider the following two cases when A 3 ≥ A 2 and A 3 < A 2 . If A 3 ≥ A 2 , then we have
where the first inequality follows from A 3 , A 4 ∈ [A 2 , A 1 ]. By dividing ∆β t (> 0 by assumption) on both sides of (EC.36), we get the inequality (EC.33). If A 3 < A 2 ,
where the second identity and the second inequality follow from the observation that if f (x) = ax 2 + bx + c with a < 0 and x * = − b 2a , then f (x * ) − f (x) = −a(x * − x) 2 . By dividing ∆β t on both sides of (EC.37), the inequality (EC.33) holds. Q.E.D.
